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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 03-1740
________________
NESTOR JUAREZ,
Petitioner
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General of the United States,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(INS No. A43-664-898)
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 26, 2004
Before: AMBRO, CHERTOFF and BECKER,
Circuit Judges
(Filed March 29, 2004)

_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
BECKER, Circuit Judge.
This is a petition for review by Nestor Juarez. For the reasons that follow, we
deny the petition. Because the parties are fully familiar with the background facts and

procedural history, we need not set them forth, and limit our discussion to our ratio
decidendi.
First, the government contends that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Juarez’s
challenge to the INS District Director’s decision because the Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
explicitly stated that her decision was not based on petitioner’s interview with the INS or
on the reasons stated in the INS District Director’s decision. W e will not belabor this
point. The government is correct about the tenor of the IJ’s statement, which was that
“[t]he basis of the Court’s decision . . . is not in any way influenced by the contents of the
denial letter provided by the District Director.” The IJ then proceeded to decide the case
based on the remaining testimony and documentary evidence that was before the
Immigration Court. Because the IJ did not adopt the District Director’s decision, that
decision is not before the Court. Juarez’s attacks on the procedures used by Officer
Zanotti when she interviewed him and Ms. Brantley, and his claims that the charging
document was “improperly issued,” were not raised before the IJ and are therefore
waived.
The principal question on appeal, as we see it, is whether substantial evidence
supports the Board and the IJ’s decisions denying the petition to waive the condition for
Juarez’s admission as a lawful permanent resident. The history of the putative marital
relationship between Juarez and Brantley is jumbled. Critical, however, are several facts.
First, Juarez admits that from 1993 to 1996 he and Brantley filed separate tax returns,
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each claiming “Head of Household” status from different addresses. While the returns
were later amended, it was permissible for the IJ to draw the inference from the numerous
separate filings that the couple were in fact not living together. Their later correction of
the tax records does not compel the conclusion that they actually lived together from 1993
to 1996, when they filed the separate returns. Second, there was significantly inconsistent
testimony by Juarez and Brantley about the number and lengths of their separation(s), and
about where they resided at different times. In our view, the IJ was entitled to: (1) make
an adverse credibility judgment about the bona fides of the Juarez-Brantley marriage; (2)
conclude that “the marriage was entered into for immigration purposes only”; (3) deny
Juarez’s petition to remove the condition; and (4) order him removed to Peru.
Juarez remonstrates at great length that the decisions of the District Director,
Immigration Judge, and Board of Immigration Appeals were impermissibly based upon
racial and ethnic profiling and, thus, were discriminatory in nature. We find utterly no
basis in the record for these claims; for the claim that the INS attorney was confused; for
the claim that the Spanish language interpreter was incompetent; or for any other claims
of procedural irregularities.
The petition for review will be denied.
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